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SHOULD WE ABOLISH THE
CONSTITUTIONAL PRIVILEGE AGAINST
SELF-INCRIMINATION?
FRED E. INBAU
Until the televised Kefauver Committee hearings several
years ago, relatively few people knew that there was such a thing
as the constitutional privilege against self-incrimination. At that
time this little lesson in civics came to the great mass of citizens
in a rather sordid fashion. They learned it from the lips of
gangsters like Tony Accardo, Joe Adonis, Joe Aiuppa, and Jack
"Greasy Thumb" Guzik. As these fellows invoked their constitutional privilege in refusing to testify, some of them had difficulty
in just parroting the words which their lawyers had written down
for them to read when they took the witness stand. Although
one hoodlum had been thoroughly coached as to what to say
when he claimed his privilege of not incriminating himself, he
mauled his statement rather badly when he said, "I refuse to answer on the ground that I might discriminate myself." They all
knew, of course, that in this country no person can be required
to testify or give evidence against himself, and that everyoneincluding a gangster-has the right to remain silent and say nothing regarding the crime for which he is suspected or accused.
That fact is rather picturesquely recorded in the official report
of the Kefauver Committee hearings. In it the reader will find
this notation with reference to Joe Aiuppa: "Let the record show
that 'the witness just sits there mute, chewing gum, saying nothing.'
Once again we are hearing a great deal about the selfincrimination privilege. During the recent Congressional hearings regarding Communist activities, there were daily reports in
the press about witnesses who refused to testify because of a fear
Originally printed in 45J. GRIM.L., CRIMINOLOGY& P.S. 180 (1954).

Hearings Before a Special Committee to Investigate Organized Crime in Interstate Commerce, Part. 5, p. 1373 (1951).
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of self-incrimination. A number of such persons were at one
time trusted officials in our Federal Government and many were
other public employees or teachers in our tax supported institutions. When asked about their Communist affiliations or subversive activities, their answers were the same as the gangsters
before the Kefauver Committee: "I refuse to answer on the
ground I might incriminate myself."
Faced with this dual menace of Communism and gangsterism, many citizens have been asking themselves: Why should we
accord such a privilege to the Communist, who is out to destroy
the very government that gives him this right to refuse to answer
incriminating questions? Why should we place this same protective cloak around the hoodlum who is himself no respecter
of the rights or privileges of anyone else, and who is just as serious a menace to our democracy as his international gangster
counterpart working under the direction of Moscow? If a person is innocent of the charge against him, why should he refuse
to answer questions? And if he is guilty, why let him refuse?
The decisions we reach in this matter and the thinking we
indulge in regarding these issues may be of tremendous consequence. Anyjudgment arrived at on the basis of aroused emotions rather than intelligent reasoning may well destroy the very
thing we are trying to preserve-democracy itself.
How, then, did this privilege against self-incrimination ever
come about? And why do we retain it in these critical times?
I. HISTORYAND POLICY OF PRIVILEGE

For several hundred years prior to the founding of the
American colonies, the English people were subjected to interrogation practices by which anyone could be required to appear
and answer under oath questions regarding heresy and other
matters involving his religious beliefs. This procedure was used
to regulate the most intimate details of daily life, and much
abuse and cruelty followed in its wake.
In the early part of the 17th century the life of the Puritans
in England was made particularly miserable by this compulsory
interrogation practice. They were thereby exposed as dissenters
and their activities constantly suppressed. Those who left England for other lands were harassed with interrogation ordeals
even as they waited on shipboard for their vessel's departure.
The ones who remained in England and fought in Cromwell's
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army used all the resources they could muster in seeking an
abolition of the practice of compulsory interrogations. The Puritan efforts met with success about the middle of the 17th century. From then on the principle prevailed that no one should
be compelled to incriminate himself.
The settlement of the American colonies took place during
the same period in English history when opposition to the compulsory interrogation procedure was most pronounced. Moreover, the colonies themselves had a short experience with
compulsory interrogations. The same factors, therefore, which
contributed to the abolition of the practice in England also accounted for a similar reaction in the colonies. It explains why
the privilege was incorporated into the constitutions of the various states and into the federal constitution as well.
So much for the history of the privilege. 2 We may next inquire, why have we retained it so long after the initial reasons
for its inception have disappeared. In other words, what are the
policy reasons which justify or explain the existence of the privilege at the present time.
The privilege against self-incrimination exists mainly in order to stimulate the police and prosecution into a search for the
most dependable evidence procurable by their own efforts.
Otherwise there probably would be an incentive to rely solely
upon the less dependable admissions that might be obtained
during the course of a compulsory interrogation. As an English
writer put it once while commenting upon the problem in India, if the police and prosecutor were relieved of this restriction,
there would be a temptation "to sit comfortably in the shade,
rubbing red pepper into a poor devil's eyes, rather than go
about in the sun hunting up evidence.'
This policy reason, plus the persuasive force of history, renders it highly unlikely that the privilege will ever be abolished as
one of our democratic concepts. Inquiry may be made, however, as to the possibility of attaching some limitations upon its
use, without a risk to our essential civil liberties. In other words,
can the use of the privilege be subjected to some modifications
that will prevent or lessen its abuses by the Communists and

' For further details and references see Inbau, SelfIncrimination-WhatCan an Accused Person
be Compelled to Do? 1-6 (1950).
'Stephen, Histoy of CiminalLaw 442 (1883).
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gangsters while at the same time leaving the privilege unimpaired with respect to all the rest of us?
II. SUGGESTED LIMITATIONS UPON THE EXERCISE OF THE
PRIVILEGE
There is ample experience in our legal history-precedent,
as the lawyers call it-in support of the view that the use of the
privilege can be safely modified so that it will become less subject to mockery by the Communist and the gangster and still
remain a sturdy bulwark in our democratic structure. An Illinois case offers a good illustration of the point.
Two Chicago police captains were assigned to investigate a
gang killing which resulted from gambling syndicate activities.
Both captains had been disciplined shortly before this assignment because of the existence of widespread gambling in the
sections of the city under their command. Now, ironically
enough, they were ordered to solve a murder committed by the
same hoodlum element whose activities the two captains had
left undisturbed to such an extent as to warrant their prior suspension from active police duties. The investigation they conducted produced some results and evidence which appeared to
be of a more or less synthetic nature and suspicion arose that
perhaps the captains were deliberately falsifying certain evidence. They were called before a grand jury, to be questioned
about their case investigation and activities. But they refused to
testify-on the ground that they might incriminate themselves!
Following the captains' claim of their self-incrimination
privilege, they were fired from the Chicago police force. They
appealed to the Illinois courts, alleging a denial of their constitutional rights. The Illinois appellate court held that although
the captains, as citizens, had a constitutional right not to testify,
once they refused to do so they lost their right to retain their
civil service status as police officers. In other words, they did
not have to testify; nor did the people of Chicago have to put up
with them as police officials.' As Supreme Court Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes once said in another case situation, no one has
a constitutional right to be a policeman. 5

4

Drury v. Hurley, 339 Ill. App. 33,88, N.E. 2d 728,402 Ill. 243,83 N.E. 2d 575 (1949), noted
in 38. J. Grim. L. & Criminology 613 (1948).
'Mc Auliffe v. City of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892).
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The same line of legal reasoning that was used in this case
of the two police captains can also be employed in the present
case situations involving federal and state officials or employees
suspected of disloyalty or treasonable conduct. This would
mean, therefore, that in a legal and properly conducted investigation into such matters by a legislative committee, grand jury,
or court, any governmental employee who invokes the privilege
against self-incrimination will thereby forfeit his right to remain
in his governmental office or position. By all means, let him
have the privilege; but divorce him from his job, either on the
ground of his being a bad security risk, or simply for the reason
that the public has the right to insist upon a higher grade of
citizenry from anyone on its payroll or representing the public
interest. In fact, we may by appropriate legislation even bar
such a person from holding any public office in the future. New
York already has such an "official good conduct" provision in its
constitution, although it was intended originally to facilitate the
removal of "corrupt" officials rather than serve as an aid in investigations into subversive activities.
Another legal principle which could be safely utilized to
good advantage in curbing Communist and gangster abuses of
the privilege is to grant immunity from prosecution to certain
suspects who invoke the privilege and then require them to disclose what they know about others who are engaged in similar
activities. The basic idea here is that in order to find and convict the most important and most dangerous criminals it is
worth the price to say to a less serious offender: "The government will waive its right to prosecute you for what you have
done, but it wants the facts and information you have regarding
the other persons involved in this criminal activity." It is not
uncommon for prosecuting attorneys to resort to this practice
even without any specific statutory authorization. They merely
make "a deal" with one of several offenders whereby the prosecutor agrees not to prosecute him in return for his testimony
regardingthe guilt of the other offenders. The objection to this
'Article 1, §6, which reads, in part, as follows: "Any public officer who, upon being called before a grand jury to testify concerning the conduct of his office or the performance of his official
duties, refuses to sign a waiver of immunity against subsequent criminal prosecution, or to answer any relevant question concerning such matters before such grand jury, shall by virtue of
such refusal, be disqualified from holding any other public office or public employment for a
period of five years, and shall be removed from office by the appropriate authority or shall forfeit his office at the suit of the Attorney General."
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arrangement is that it is "under the table," so to speak, and is
subject to abuse both by the prosecution and the witness.
Many states already have laws authorizing the granting of
immunity to witnesses in certain types of case situations-usually
in hearings conducted by administrative law commissions (e.g.,
commerce commissions, insurance commissions, etc.); and a
few states have a general immunity statute for use in regular
criminal trials. Such laws have been upheld as constitutionally
valid.7 The only important constitutional requirement is that
the immunity must be complete in every respect. In other
words, an immunity statute is invalid if it merely assures the witness that what he says under compulsion will not be used
against him in a subsequent criminal prosecution. He must also
be given a guarantee that he will not even be prosecuted for any
offense about which he is asked to testify. This legal requirement accounts for the fact that practically all of the hoodlums
who defied the Kefauver Committee eventually escaped the contempt penalties imposed upon them. The courts ruled that the
old immunity statute under which the Committee had acted was
fatally defective because it gave the witness no guarantee against
a future prosecution; it only protected him from the later use of
the actual statements which would constitute his enforced testimony. Of all the defiant witnesses only Frank Costello went to
jail and he did so because he walked out on the Committee
rather than do what his fellow hoodlums had done and stand by
his self-incrimination privilege.8 Had he relied upon the privilege he would not have been convicted.
There is need for federal as well as state legislation which
will provide for the granting of complete immunity to persons
who claim their privilege against self-incrimination before any
legislative committee, grand jury, or court. The law should be
general in application so that it can be used in the investigation
and prosecution of all major criminal offenses-including gangsterism and subversive activity.9
'See Hill and Walker, =LegislationConcerningAlbis,Pejuy, SeyIncaiminationImmunity, Official
Conduct, and GrandJuries,"39J. Crim. L. & Criminology 629, atp. 639-43 (1949).
'U.S. v. Costello, 198 F.2d 200 (1952).
'The 1954 session of Congress passed an immunity act, but it is restricted in its scope to investigations and prosecutions for subversive activities. (Public Law 600, approved August 20,
1954; 62 Stat. 833) This act contains, however, certain safeguards against the unwarranted grant
of immunity to persons who should not be permitted to escape prosecution in this manner. For
instance, before a witness at a committee hearing can be granted immunity two thirds of the
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III. CONCLUSION
We can considerably reduce the amount of mockery now
leveled at our self-incrimination privilege, and we can better
preserve it, by the enactment of "official good conduct" and
"immunity" legislation of the types herein suggested. And this
can be accomplished without the risk of losing our basic civil
liberties.

members of the full committee must approve; and before a federal district attorney may accord
immunity to a witness, the Attorney General's approval is required. Any general immunity statute should incorporate comparable safeguards.
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